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ABSTRACT 
 After a military coup in Peru in 1968, General Juan Velasco Alvarado began a 
political, economic, and security relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
This marked the first instance of the Soviet Union gaining a foothold in South America, 
and Peru became one of the largest purchasers of Soviet-made military equipment in 
Latin America. Peru and Russia have renewed their relationship in the years since 2008. 
This thesis compares the similarities between Soviet and contemporary Russian 
interaction with Peru, assesses the level of influence Russia currently has, and gauges the 
threat to American interests. 
 Research consulted available unclassified scholarly work. It is most likely in 
Peru’s national security interest to diversify partnerships, and to upgrade and maintain 
military equipment. Russia’s motivations are ambiguous, and Russia may be attempting 
to undermine U.S. influence in Peru by increasing Peru’s reliance on Moscow. 
 This thesis has discovered Russia’s influence does not currently rise to a 
significant national security threat for the United States or Peru. However, the more 
connected the two countries become, the more power Russia may hold over the fragile 
and politically chaotic state of Peru. It is critical that the United States maintains an active 
role in Peru and remains an engaged and reliable partner. If the United States is able to 
maintain a strong relationship with Peru, it will be able to lessen Russia’s influence. 
v 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
During the Cold War, after a coup and the installation of a military government in 
1968, Peru established strong economic and military ties with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union), which could have been considered the 
Soviet Union’s gateway into South America. In recent years, Peru has re-established ties 
with the Russian Federation in a fashion that echoes those Cold War relations. The 
questions must be asked: what were the nature and motivation for interactions from the 
Soviet and Peruvian perspectives? And, how do recent Peruvian-Russian relations 
compare to Soviet economic, military, and political ties? Are the motivations similar, and 
what does this entail for security and the United States’ influence in the region?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Russia once again started expanding its global influence around 2008. Instruments 
including hybrid warfare, hacking, meddling, military harassment, and territorial 
annexation have escalated since. Although Russia after the Cold War was opposed to the 
West on several issues including the Balkan conflicts, NATO expansion, accusations of 
human rights abuses during the Chechnyan wars, etc., serious cause for concern began 
with the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Evidence of Russia as a hostile power 
increased during the proxy war in Ukraine along with the annexation of Crimea, and 
finally the 2016 United States presidential election meddling. In “Providing for the 
Common Defense,” an unclassified assessment of the U.S. National Defense Strategy 
Commission, the word “Russia” is listed 110 times in 99 pages.1 Prior Defense Secretary 
Jim Mattis warned that Russia desires to build its global influence over other countries’ 
economic, 
1 National Defense Strategy Commission, “Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and 
Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission” (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute for Peace, November 13, 2018), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-
the-common-defense.pdf. 
2 
economic, political, and security decisions.2 Russia is actively undermining and 
exploiting the global world order while simultaneously reaping its benefits.3 It seeks to 
undermine United States influence, make economies less open and fair, control 
information, and expand its military and global influence.4 The resurgence of Russia as a 
hostile threat to the United States and her allies is important to study and understand.  
Current Russian activity in the context of Latin America is a little-explored topic 
that deserves more attention. Russian resurgence in Latin America began around the 
same time as the Georgian conflict, and while emphasis is often placed on Cuba, 
Nicaragua, and Venezuela, understanding how Russia is interacting with less newsworthy 
states is important in order to anticipate Russian actions in the region as a whole.5 Dr. 
Robert Evan Ellis, who has called attention to Russian resurgence, points out that U.S. 
foreign policy in Latin America has been largely regionally focused. Therefore, the 
involvement of Russian activity expands issues to the global geo-strategic.6 The United 
States’ checkered past with Latin America, mainly through military intervention in 
Central America and the Caribbean, has left deep scars in the region that are not easily 
forgotten. Increased Russian influence could drive partners away from the United States 
and undermine U.S. relationships and future opportunities.  
The choice of Peru as a case study is not arbitrary in the context of understanding 
recent Russian activity as compared to Soviet interaction during the Cold War. Peru was 
by far the largest customer of Soviet military sales in South America, and was a major 
trading partner with the Communist Bloc.7 Currently, Peru is also one of Russia’s most 




4 Donald J. Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: 
U.S. White House Office, December 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
5 Robert Evan Ellis, The New Russian Engagement with Latin America: Strategic Position, Commerce, 
and Dreams of the Past (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015), V. 
6 Ellis, vi. 
7 Ruben Berrios and Cole Blasier, “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969-1989): Distant Partners,” Journal 
of Latin American Studies 23, no. 2 (1991): 365–84. 
3 
crucial partners in terms of arms sales and military interaction in Latin America.8 By 
exploring past Soviet influence and interaction with Peru and comparing them to current 
Russian activity, a better understanding of Russian goals for Peru and the region may be 
realized. With an increased awareness of Russian intentions, the United States will be 
positioned to make calculated and informed foreign policy decisions with regard to Peru 
and Latin America more generally. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to understand the relationship between Peru, the Soviet Union, and 
modern Russia, this thesis will examine a broad scope of literature. The military, 
economic, cultural, political, financial, and technical relationship will be examined in two 
timeframes: from the rise of the Velasco administration in 1968 until the end of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, and post-2008 Russian resurgence. Because there is very little 
written just on Peru, this literature review will examine Soviet policy starting from the 
wider perspective of the entire less-developed world, then specifically Latin America, 
and finally in regard to Peru. With an understanding of the Soviet policy on these three 
levels of analysis, policy and interests from the Peruvian perspective will be examined. 
Finally, the historical relationship will be compared to the post-2008 relationship and 
current Russian and Peruvian foreign policy goals.  
1. The Soviets and the Third World 
The most readily available literature is written from the perspective of Soviet 
foreign policy in Latin America and the larger Third World. The Soviet Union’s policy 
regarding less-developed countries evolved over time during the Cold War as the Soviet 
Union expanded its area of interest from Eurasia to focus on the Third World. Francis 
Fukuyama argues this Soviet policy change stems from three basic structural changes in 
world dynamics.9 First, Soviet military, nuclear weapons investment, and diplomatic and 
political changes created an atmosphere where the Soviet Union was less concerned with 
 
8 Ellis, The New Russian Engagement with Latin America, 55. 
9 Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last 
Three Decades (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 1. 
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Europe and branched out to the broader globe. Second, the spread of the Soviet-
dominated communist ideology had been undermined in various places around the world. 
Third, the Soviet Union wished to create a system where there was a more stable 
international environment with the West.10 Within the context of these three 
developments, the conclusion drawn for the Soviet pivot toward less-developed counties 
is that the Soviet Union wished to create a system which ultimately tilted in its favor. 
According to Fukuyama, less-developed countries lacked clear lines of demarcation 
between East and West, and were marked by political instability which proved opportune 
to spread Soviet influence.11  
Another argument for Soviet focus on the Third World is that the Soviet Union 
wished to spread communist ideology to less-developed countries.12 It is apparent, early 
in the years following World War II, that the Soviets considered spreading socialist 
doctrine and propping up communist parties as a path to influence.13 The idea was that 
revolutionary governments would be more susceptible to communist inclinations, and 
would be amenable to Soviet allure and influence. Fukuyama expands on Soviet Third 
World strategy and states that promotion of communist ideals played a part in foreign 
policy and was admittedly a useful tool in furthering state interests, but that the Soviet 
Union began to move away from the strategy of promoting Marxism in foreign 
countries.14 An active Soviet attempt to spread communism in the less-developed world 
in the early days of the post-WWII Soviet Union was part of the motivation for Soviet 
focus on less-developed countries. 
Fukuyama argues that there were four main aspects of Soviet policy with regard 
to the Third World. First, the Soviet Union wanted to create an enduring presence as a 
 
10 Korbonski and Fukuyama, 1. 
11 Korbonski and Fukuyama, 23. 
12 “The Soviet Union and the Third World,” Strategic Survey 78, no. 1 (January 1977): 64–68, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/04597237708460416. 
13 Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Berlin, 
NY: W. de Gruyter, 1986), 807. 
14 Korbonski and Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and the Third World, 43. 
5 
great power, which required active expansion and self-assertion.15 Second was the desire 
to undermine Western influence. At times this meant replacing the West within a country, 
but at others the Soviet Union would be better served not filling a vacuum, but gaining an 
advantage or upper hand.16 Third was minimizing the Chinese role. The Soviet Union 
regarded China as a competitor to the Marxist model of national liberation in the Third 
World.17 Finally, the Soviet Union wanted to gain a voice in regional affairs. As a global 
power, the Soviet Union desired political influence in the Third World in order to 
advance its interests.18 Overall, in an international relations realist perspective, the Soviet 
Union sought to increase its relative power in the Third World vis-à-vis the United States 
militarily, economically, and politically. 
2. The Soviets and Latin America 
There is a fair amount of literature regarding Soviet foreign policy in Latin 
America specifically. Much of the broader theories overlap scholarship on the Third 
World, although there are minor differences. It is difficult to consider Soviet policy 
outside the lens of United States’ interests. Latin America was considered too close 
geographically and economically, and strongly influenced by the United States, therefore 
the Soviet Union risked instigating conflict and Cold War escalation from activity in the 
region.19 Nonetheless, this risk was not enough to stop military sales, economic ties, and 
attempts at influence through soft power. 
One hypothesis centers on access and influence. Cole Blasier, a prolific writer on 
the Soviet Union in Latin America, argues that Soviet presence in Latin America 
provided opportunity for information and intelligence gathering, opening communication 
 
15 Eusebio Mujal-León, ed., The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship (Boston, MA: 
Unwin Hyman, 1989), 12. 
16 Mujal-León, 15. 
17 Mujal-León, 16. 
18 Mujal-León, 14. 
19 Laird and Hoffmann, Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 824; Ruben Berrios, “Soviet-Latin 
American Economic Relations,” Comparative Economic Studies 31, no. Winter (1989): 85. 
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lines, and broader influence within institutions such as the United Nations.20 Although 
Soviet foreign policy originally placed Latin America at the bottom of the world priority 
due to geographic distance, historical ties, and difficulty projecting power from afar, by 
the late 1960s the Soviet Union had developed a significant diplomatic presence that 
included commercial and cultural relations.21 Through access and influence, the Soviet 
Union sought to tip the scales in Latin America in its favor. 
Soviet interest in Latin America was evidenced by increasing economic ties.22 
Richard Schroeder suggests that economic interaction, while including elements of a 
desire for influence, also was motivated by monetary self-interest and the goal of global 
competition with the United States.23 Part of the economic shift included a Soviet 
realization of the existence of a single world market versus two opposing economic 
systems, and that to be competitive, the Soviet Union needed to broaden its markets to 
trade with the Third World.24 Although trade relations with Latin America did not to 
prove to be financially lucrative (the Soviet Union sustained a massive trade deficit and 
large lines of credit to the region), they benefited the Soviet image and established ties 
where the socialist doctrine was not necessarily desirable.25 The Soviet Union’s sales of 
arms to the region constituted a large portion of trade, especially with Peru. the Soviet 
Union sought out influence and financial footholds, but military sales were more 
successful in achieving an enduring presence in the form of advisors, technicians, 
attachés, and support facilities.26 Overall, most scholars agree that in Latin America, 
Soviet lack of capacity and a close proximity to the United States prohibited the Soviet 
 
20 Cole Blasier, The Giant’s Rival: The USSR and Latin America, Rev. ed, Pitt Latin American Series 
(Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 21. 
21 Laird and Hoffmann, Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 830. 
22 Berrios, “Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations,” 83. 
23 Richard Schroeder, “Soviets’ Latin Influence,” Editorial Research Reports (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, March 6, 1987), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1987030600. 
24 Berrios, “Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations.” 
25 Schroeder, “Soviets’ Latin Influence.” 
26 Berrios, “Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations,” 75. 
7 
Union from expending more than a small amount of resources in the region.27 By design 
or coincidence, it has been determined that although the Soviet Union did not benefit a 
great deal economically, its market interaction solidified Soviet presence in the region. 
3. The Soviets and Peru 
Peru turned toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War following the 
overthrow of the civilian government by General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1968.  
Ruben Berrios, who has written extensively on Latin America and Peru, argues (and 
other sources agree) that Peru attempted to circumvent U.S. influence through various 
methods, which included establishing relations with the Soviet Union.28 Reasons for 
circumventing U.S. influence most likely stemmed from a motivation of both nationalism 
and anti-imperialism. Peru wished to assert its sovereignty by not necessarily taking sides 
with either the West or the East, as demonstrated by seeking to open its markets with any 
country which could be beneficial to Peru.29 Russia was also able to provide quick 
delivery of sufficient quality military and industrial equipment at lower prices and better 
terms than other countries.30 Peru began to seek methods of further promoting its 
independence by joining the United Nations Nonaligned Movement, and becoming an 
activist within the UN to promote a “New International Economic Order” which would 
increase Third World participation in decision-making in the world economy.31 The CIA 
 
27 Berrios, 87.  The Soviet Union was more restrained in its activity in the Western Hemisphere after 
the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
28 Richard J. Walter, Peru and the United States, 1960-1975: How Their Ambassadors Managed 
Foreign Relations in a Turbulent Era (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 
157; George Philip, “The Soldier as Radical: The Peruvian Military Government, 1968-1975,” Journal of 
Latin American Studies 8, no. 1 (1976): 29–51; Berrios, “Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations,” 69. 
29 Ronald Bruce St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1992), 
188–89. 
30 Berrios and Blasier, “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989),” 365.  
31 James D. Rudolph, Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis, Politics in Latin America (NY: Praeger, 1992), 
58; Central Intelligence Agency, “Peru: Prospects for Increased Soviet Bloc Influence,” CIA FOIA, 
November 1985, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87t00573r001001310001-7; 
Ruben Berrios, “Relations between Peru and the Socialist Countries,” East European Quarterly; Boulder 
21, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 99–118. 
8 
regarded the shift to a nationalistic self-interest as rather radical.32 The literature 
generally agrees that a major motivation for Peru’s shift toward the Soviet Union was its 
desire to diversify partners and distance itself from the United States. 
Other sources point toward the United States’ actions and reactions for Peru’s 
pivot toward the Soviet Union. Relations with the United States had become difficult 
even before the 1968 coup. Earlier in the 1960s, the United States had refused to sell Peru 
U.S.-built F-5 fighter jets, and Peru purchased French Mirage jets instead. On top of its 
refusal to sell military equipment, the United States threatened to block exports from Peru 
after a long-running dispute over Peru’s assertion of a 200-nautical mile exclusive 
economic zone for its fishing industry.33 Velasco began nationalizing United States 
industries, including the International Petroleum Company, which led the United States 
to block military sales and economic assistance from the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Development Bank.34 The United States and 
Peruvian relations soured due to nationalizations of U.S.-based firms, but the quarrel with 
the United States predated Velasco. The idea that a turn toward the Soviet Union was 
directly a result of Velasco is misleading, and could be viewed instead as a turn away 
from the United States. 
There are several possible explanations for the Soviet Union’s motivation in 
assuming a much larger economic and military relationship with Peru. Trade increased 
from zero to tens and in some years hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars (USD) annually, 
and the Soviet Union sold Peru hundreds of tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets, among 
others which will be detailed in Chapter II.35 Richard Schroeder argues that the Soviets 
saw General Velasco as a progressive, possibly socialist leader who could rally toward 
 
32 Central Intelligence Agency, “Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship” (CIA FOIA, 
December 1982), 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83s00855r000200150006-
2. 
33 Walter, Peru and the United States, 1960-1975, 38. 
34 Hal Brands, “The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 
21, no. 3 (September 14, 2010): 471–90, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2010.508418. 
35 Berrios and Blasier, “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989)”; Central Intelligence Agency, “Peru-
USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship.” 
9 
Soviet ideology.36 The CIA believed the Soviet Union desired to leverage trade, 
diplomatic relations, and aid to gain support for its international policies, respectability, 
institutionalization of the Peru-Soviet Union relationship, and economic benefits (though 
economics were thought to be secondary by some sources).37 To a certain extent, the 
Soviet Union may have viewed Peru as a gateway into South America. Ruben Berrios 
and Cole Blasier argue that the Soviet Union did not have a solid foothold in South 
America, and required an entrance for air traffic, ports of call and infrastructure to service 
ships, and access to the south Pacific, and Peru was seen as a model to replicate 
throughout the region.38 The CIA believed another motivation of the Soviets could have 
been covert intelligence collection, supporting radical movements, or to spread 
communist propaganda.39 While there may have been multiple Soviet motivations for 
expanding the Peru-Soviet Union relationship, all sources basically agree that access and 
influence were top of the list. 
4. Contemporary Russia, Latin America, and Peru 
To understand Russian Motivations in Latin America and Peru, modern Russian 
foreign policy must be examined overall. Most scholars agree, including the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Dr. Anne Clunan, that Russia wishes to regain status as a great 
power on the world stage in order to legitimize geopolitical ambitions, and to manage the 
complicated relationship with the West—a relationship of both rivalry and cooperation.40 
In many ways, these policy goals harken to Cold War strategy, and some authors argue 
that Cold War tactics of ideological manipulation, disinformation, proxy war, 
 
36 Schroeder, “Soviets’ Latin Influence,” 4. 
37 Central Intelligence Agency, “Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship.” 
38 Berrios and Blasier, “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969-1989).” 
39 Central Intelligence Agency, “Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship.” 
40 Eugene Rumer and Julia Gurganus, “Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, February 20, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-
s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067.  
Anne Clunan, “Russia’s Pursuit of Great-Power Status and Security,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Russian Security, by Roger E. Kanet (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 3–16. 
10 
assassination, and intelligence have not changed but expanded.41 Russian intellectuals, 
such as Sergei Karaganov, specifically call not for strengthening relations with the West, 
but for shaping a new multipolar world order in which Western ideals and primacy are 
challenged.42 
Academic journals, think-tanks, and news agencies have begun publishing articles 
on the motivations behind recent Russian reemergence in Latin America. Victor Jeifets 
argues that Russian trade with Latin America has been on an upturn, which could imply 
economic reasons for Russian resurgence.43 Diana Negroponte argues that preferential 
trade with the Soviet Union undermines reliance on U.S. markets, which would bolster 
Russia’s stance in the region.44 She continues to explain that expanding economic 
relations with Latin America is also a way of sidestepping Western sanctions and 
diversifying Russian economic opportunity.45 Economic interaction with the region 
remains extremely small at just 2% of Russia’s total foreign trade, and foreign direct 
investment in Latin America and the Caribbean is a mere $10 million of a total 
$27 billion USD.46 Still, Russia remains poised to offer an alternative to Latin American 
nations which view the United States as unreliable and uncooperative..47 
Another hypothesis for Russia’s expansion into Latin America concerns Russia’s 
desire for increased foreign influence. Dr. R. Evan Ellis has noted that Russian activity 
has focused on historical partners in the anti-U.S. Bolivarian Alliance for the People of 
 
41 Rumer and Gurganus, “Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective.” 
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our America (ALBA) regime.48 He argues that Russia is more likely to gain influence in 
countries of historic friendly relations. Marie Gurganus from the Carnegie Endowment 
argues that poor relations between the United States and Latin America on disagreements 
in the world international forum over NATO and U.S. military conflicts, migration, and 
trade relations have provided an opening for Russia to exploit.49 This is seen by some as 
a clear return to Cold War tactics by using power projection to diminish U.S. influence.50  
Hand-in-hand with increased influence is a theory that Russia’s goals are to 
undermine the United States and Western influence in Latin America. Vladimir 
Rouvinski from the Wilson Center believes that Russia regards a move into Latin 
America as penetrating the United States’ backyard, not unlike current NATO expansion 
into Eastern Europe and the Balkans.51 This hypothesis is further supported by noting 
Russia’s support for the ALBA countries, which are generally less friendly to 
U.S. influence. By arming anti-U.S. regimes in Latin America and expanding influence in 
neutral countries, Russia may be able to isolate pro-U.S. countries like Chile and 
Colombia.52 Undermining Western influence is in line with Russia’s broader foreign 
policy goals of regaining great power status, and recreating the current world order. 
Hypotheses of Peru’s motivations for increased relations with Russia are more 
limited in number. Ellis argues that Russian involvement seems natural in order to 
upgrade and service legacy Soviet military equipment.53 Juan Cardenal from the National 
Endowment for Democracy explains that Vladimir Putin is revered as a strong-man 
leader in Peru, and Russian resurgence may be a form of soft influence that while not 
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holding much political sway, is symbolic of a far-flung Russian reach.54 Most sources 
agree that Russian resurgence in Peru and Latin America is motivated by nationally self-
interested states wishing to diversify reliance on the United States and bolster national 
security and a Russian desire to undermine United States influence in its near abroad. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
While there are several possible explanations for Russia’s resurgence into Peru, 
my hypotheses are the following. From Peru’s standpoint, Peru has dated Soviet military 
equipment which needs maintenance and upgrades in order to be useful to maintain 
national security. In this light, it seems fairly obvious that it is in Peru’s national interest 
to renew ties with Russia. Hence, one explanation could be that Peru is attempting to 
boost its national security by renewing relations with Russia. To explore this hypothesis, 
an investigation into Peruvian current national security concerns will be required. 
Economically, the Peruvian economy does not overlap markets with Russia, and 
expanding trade is also in Peru’s national interest. Therefore, another explanation could 
be that working with Russia is a form of diversification of trade and security partners as 
undertaken in the 1970s. Alternatively, Peru may be cozying with Russia in order to 
balance against the United States or China. In order to explore the relationship further, 
current points of contention between Peru and the United States and China will be 
researched. In sum, it seems most likely that Peru’s motivations pivot on national self-
interest to increase economic opportunities and partners and to maintain familiar security 
relationships and military equipment dating back to the 1970s . 
Russia’s motivations for a renewed relationship in Peru are opaque, and beg the 
question if this is a return to strategic multipolar great power politics. Russia stands to 
gain little from renewed economic ties with Peru, and may incur financial risks similar to 
those in the 1980s when the Soviet Union cancelled 1/5 of Peru’s debt due to the inability 
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of repayment.55 Therefore, while economic diversification is a possibility, it is unlikely. 
Russia’s motivations may be the same old Cold War mentality—to undermine United 
States interests through influence, presence, economic ties, and soft-power. Moscow may 
hope that increased economic and political influence in Peru and Latin America help 
solidify Russia’s claims to great power status. Russia may be attempting to re-establish a 
foothold in South America in order to spread pro-Russian sentiment, anti-American 
sentiment, to sway politics toward Russian interest, or establish clandestine listening 
posts and opportunity for espionage. It may be that Moscow believes expanded reach will 
further the worldview of Russia and undermine United States influence. While it may not 
be possible to learn the exact intentions of Russia’s Latin America resurgence, this 
research hopes to shed further light on this issue. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes a multi-front approach involving historical and current 
material. On the historical side, there is a wide selection of sources which cover the 
Peruvian, Latin American, and Communist perspectives on the Cold War and foreign 
policy. This research will draw upon books, journal articles, reports, and declassified 
documents. The material will be analyzed and studied from the perspectives of the Soviet 
Union, Peru, Latin America, and the United States, and will draw conclusions for each 
actor’s motivations based on historical evidence. As some view Russian resurgence as a 
reversion to Cold War strategy, understanding the Soviet tactics in Peru may enlighten 
the current Russian strategy. 
To build an understanding of Peru and Russia’s current motivations may require 
an amount of inference based on wider Latin American samples. There is little 
information written on Russian intentions in Peru, therefore a wider view of Russian 
activity within Latin America must be studied. Then, based on the broader scope and 
current Peruvian foreign policy concerns, conclusions may be drawn to each country’s 
motivations. Material to be researched will mostly rely on current news, recent journal 
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articles, unclassified government documents on policy, and think tank pieces. By 
focusing on Russian activity in Peru, ALBA countries, South America, and more broadly 
Latin America, and understanding Russian and Peruvian interests, current motivations for 
Russia’s resurgence may be gleaned. 
Once there is a strong understanding of both historic and current interest for Peru 
and Russia’s interactions, similarities and differences can be compared. If there is a 
significant amount of difference, this research will inform which gaps must be filled in 
order to better understand Russian motivations. If there are great similarities, lessons may 
be learned from past actions and policies which can better inform United States and 
Peruvian future paths. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis will be arranged chronologically from the Cold War era to today. 
Chapter II examines Peru-Soviet and communist block political, economic, and military 
ties in the 1970s after the military coup. It continues through the 1980s until the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, due to economic concerns in both Russia and Peru and 
the drastic situation after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was little interaction 
between the two states and between Russia and Latin America in general.56 Chapter III 
examines renewed Russian and Peruvian political, economic, security, media, and 
cultural relations in the 2000s until 2019. Chapter IV provides concluding analysis. 
 
 
56 Jeifets, “Russia Is Coming Back to Latin America: Perspectives and Obstacles,” 91. 
15 
II. COLD WAR PERU—SOVIET UNION RELATIONS 
Apart from Nicaragua and Cuba, the Soviet Union had closer relations with Peru 
in Latin America than all other countries during the Cold War. The previous chapter 
highlighted that this thesis will attempt to determine if Russia’s resurgence in Peru is a 
throwback to prior Cold War strategy and tactics. To make this determination, the 
engagement between the Soviet Union and Peru must first be analyzed. This chapter will 
explore the Soviet Union along with other Warsaw Pact countries’ relationship with Peru 
from the beginning of the Velasco regime until the collapse of the Soviet Union by 
focusing on the diplomatic, economic, and security dimensions. 
A. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
The Peruvian Socialist Party was founded in 1928 as the first communist party in 
Peru, and changed its name to the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) in 1930.57 It 
traditionally and consistently was loyal to the Soviet Union, but never gained a foothold 
in Peru as a major political party. This was partly due to competition from another left-
leaning party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). Both parties 
advocated for a Peru-centric nationalism and for indigenous rights, but APRA 
emphasized alliance between classes, and achieved a larger following. Like the PCP, 
APRA was also founded in the 1920s but by an extremely charismatic leader, Víctor Raúl 
Haya de la Torre, and from the beginning was more popular than the PCP.58 The PCP 
never had charismatic leadership, and often aimed its animosity at APRA instead of right 
wing parties, where it frequently made concessions.59 Finally, in 1964, the PCP split into 
two factions, the Marxist and the Maoist camps, with the Maoist side forming the 
beginnings of Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path, the infamous terrorist group, which 
was denounced by the Soviet Union since 1969.60 In sum, the Peruvian Communist Party 
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never gained popularity because it was overshadowed by the APRA party and suffered 
internal struggles as well as mismanagement. Without a strong communist party for the 
Soviet Union to support, the Soviet Union had little means to support a rise of 
communism in Peru. 
It is important to understand the foreign policy standpoint and mentality of the 
Velasco administration while considering Peru’s political relationship with the Soviet 
Union and the Communist Bloc. Velasco’s self-titled “revolution” was nationalist in 
nature, and proclaimed an end to foreign dependence. Although to Western eyes many of 
the actions taken following the coup, such as the nationalization of the International 
Petroleum Company (IPC), seemed socialist, Velasco sided neither with communism nor 
with capitalism, and wished to avoid the Cold War rivalry.61 Most importantly, the 
regime railed against imperialism with the goal of eliminating external pressures and 
opening new opportunities. The regime was particularly interested in maintaining and 
strengthening Peruvian sovereignty, and wished to avoid entanglements which would 
make Peru beholden to foreign powers. 
Before the coup of 1968 and the rise of General Velasco, the Soviet Union did not 
have a foothold in South America, and had no diplomatic relations with Peru. In 1960, 
the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with just three countries in Latin America, 
Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina, and most Latin American states were traditionally 
uninterested in Soviet diplomatic relations or were pressured by the United States to keep 
a distance.62 Between 1968 and 1969, Peru opened diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.63 The first Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was placed in Moscow in February 1969, and in 
1972 diplomatic relations were established with the German Democratic Republic.64 The 
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Soviet Union was particularly pleased that Velasco allowed the Peruvian Communist 
Party to continue to operate even though political parties in general were banned.65  
Most diplomatic interaction with the Soviet Union involved the signing of various 
agreements and increased modes of communication. Peru hoped to bolster its economy 
through increased interaction with the industrially strong Soviet Union. Weeks after 
establishing formal diplomatic relations, Peru and the Soviet Union signed a trade 
agreement which was hailed by Velasco as ending dependency on the United States.66 
Peru opened its seaports and airports to the Soviet Union in 1971, and ships began 
travelling from the Baltic to Peru twice a month, as well as the first Soviet flights to Latin 
America by way of the Russian airline Aeroflot in 1974.67 In 1971, Peru and the Soviet 
Union signed an agreement to work on technical and economic fronts on various 
industrial projects.68 The Peruvian military (especially the Navy) was expressly anti-
communist, and did not fear Soviet penetration in diplomatic affairs since it currently 
held power in the country.69 Peru desired a relationship with Russia to affirm its 
independence from the United States and to assist with bolstering the economy and 
security, and in return, Peru had a wealth of raw materials to offer. The diplomatic 
relations established opened avenues for economic and security assistance which will be 
discussed sections B and C. 
The diplomatic opening of Peru to the Soviet Union would lead to massive 
economic and military interactions between the two countries which could only be 
compared to Cuba in the size and scale in Latin America. Peru would go on to continue 
its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until the fall of communism and the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. Due to the relative weakness of the Peruvian Communist 
Party and its lack of influence in the Velasco regime, along with the aversion of Velasco 
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to align ideologically with either great power, there is little if any evidence that the Soviet 
Union had strong effects diplomatically. Peru never aligned itself politically with the 
Soviet Union, and Moscow was never able to successfully influence Peru’s internal or 
external political policies.70 
B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
General Velasco made radical changes to the Peruvian economy after taking 
power. His goals were to gain economic independence and to seek new relationships with 
foreign capital by readjusting the capitalist centers of power.71 For the first time, Peru 
gained full control of its trade with foreign countries by nationalizing fishing, mining, 
and oil, three key sectors in the economy. This allowed Peru to negotiate on a direct 
government-to-government basis without the involvement of private local and foreign 
intermediaries.72 Peru also wished to diversify trade to gain more favorable prices, and 
export to markets with fewer barriers to entry.73 As noted in Section A, soon after taking 
power, Velasco began making economic ties with the Soviet Union and Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, the economic organization headed by the Soviet 
Union to promote Eastern Bloc development) countries.74 The goal was to diversify trade 
dependence, broaden supply lines, open new markets for imports and exports, and to have 
sources for new lines of credit. Relationships took the form of traditional trade and Soviet 
aid such as low interest lines of credit, education for Peruvian students and technicians, 
and technical expertise.75 This section will cover Peru’s economic relations with the 
Soviet Union and eastern European countries in the form of trade, various forms of 
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economic cooperation, and countertrade. Section C will cover Soviet Union transfers and 
sales of military equipment and other security assistance measures. 
1. Trade 
Peru’s exports to European socialist countries focused on a small number of 
commodities, notably frozen fish and fishmeal, minerals, including copper, zinc, silver, 
iron and lead, coffee, sugar, and cotton.76 Imports from the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance countries included medical instruments and equipment, machinery, agriculture 
industry products, mining equipment, electrical equipment, and military equipment 
(which will be covered in Section C).77 Peru generally exported raw materials and 
imported finished manufactured products. The raw materials for finished products model 
was similar to the relationship Peru had with the United States except that the imports 
came from a diversified or different set of countries. Figure 1 and Table 1 show the 
balance of trade with the Soviet Union, and Table 2 depicts Peru’s overall trade. It should 
be noted that while trade increased dramatically with CMEA countries, it also continued 
to increase with the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC). Trade 
with the CMEA did not result in displacement of the already established economic 
relationship with the West.  
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Figure 1. Peru’s Trade Balance with the Soviet Union (in millions of USD).78 
 Peru’s Trade Balance with the Soviet Union (in millions of USD).79 
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The levels of trade between Peru and the CMEA remained relatively low and 
fluctuated drastically. Both Peru and its new socialist partners were inexperienced in their 
trade domains. The socialist states in general were relatively new to world trade, and 
traditionally transnational capitalist firms had been the source of capital and trade with 
Peru.81 During the early 1970s, in order to more effectively govern foreign trade, Peru 
established administrative and legal frameworks, the CMEA sent permanent commercial 
representatives to Peru, and Velasco sent economic attachés to Moscow and opened a 
commercial office in Prague.82 The intent of these actions was to better facilitate the 
economic relationship. Ruben Berrios, the most prolific writer on Peru’s relationship with 
the communist bloc during the Cold War, depicted the economic relationship in 1987 as 
follows:83 
1. Agreements are usually established on a bilateral basis, which sets the 
basic patterns and procedures for trade. Normally these agreements are 
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discussed thoroughly by a joint intergovernmental commission in order to 
specify areas of mutual cooperation and assure their fulfillment, discuss 
problems, and adopt measures designed to achieve further progress in 
trade. 
2. Agreements are normally on a long-term basis, five years on average. 
Although it is possible to plan foreign trade because it contains 
commodity lists outlining mutual needs and guidance to specific trade 
transactions, this was never tried in Peru. 
3. Peru has been granted most-favored-nation status. There are favorable 
tariff reductions, and this also includes export licenses. 
4. Trade agreements stipulate that payments shall be made in convertible 
foreign exchange. 
5. Finally, trade credits have been generous. According to one source, “the 
terms have been advantageous to Peru with regard to the number of years 
for reinvestment, rates of interest, amount, categories of goods for which 
the credits were available, etc. 
The overall results of Peru’s new trade strategy greatly enhanced economic 
relations with the CMEA and the Soviet Union. As noted in the previous tables, exports 
from Peru in particular made a dramatic increase, even if they fluctuated from year to 
year. The trade agreements put in place during the Velasco regime began to show 
significant increases around the time General Velasco was replaced by General Morales 
Bermúdez in 1975. After democracy was restored to Peru in 1980, and Fernando 
Belaúnde Terry was re-elected to the presidency, trade with the CMEA decreased as it 
was redirected back toward traditional Western partners.84 Belaúnde’s re-election was 
very much a backlash to the policies of the military government, and an electoral desire 
of the population to return to perceived political norms.85 President Alan García assumed 
office in 1985 and signed a number of trade agreements and contracts with the Soviet 
Union, increasing trade levels until the latter half of the decade.86 At the end of the 
1980s, Peru suffered a massive financial crisis, and the communist regimes began to 
disintegrate, bringing an end to the Cold War relationship. 
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2. Economic Cooperation 
Peru and the CMEA countries had a number of economic endeavors apart from 
strictly trade and foreign exchange. The United States had also withheld loans and aid 
due to Peru’s nationalization of the International Petroleum Company (IPC). The 
Hickenlooper Amendment allowed the United States to terminate economic assistance 
and block access to loans from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Inter-
American Development Bank to countries which expropriated American assets.87 
Although it was never formally invoked in the case of Peru and the IPC, the United States 
effectively was able to withhold economic assistance throughout the 1970s. The 
communist countries were more amenable to funding and providing aid for projects 
which other creditors were more averse; hence, Peru turned toward Eastern Europe in 
order to obtain funding and financial assistance. 
When Peru first opened economic relations with the CMEA, it signed a 
comprehensive approach to not just economic, but also technical and scientific 
cooperation.88 Technology transfers were mostly in the form of industrial machinery, 
receipt of technical assistance and expertise or services, training of Peruvian students and 
professionals, and joint capital investment ventures. Peru had traditionally imported 
machinery and equipment from the West, but Soviet products came at a cheaper price 
while still being of sufficient quality and having easier terms of payback and credit.89 
Much of the equipment purchased was associated with various development projects, and 
included services such as instruction, assembly, technical advice, and training. 
Many of the economic agreements signed involved development projects within 
Peru. These included oil exploration, hydroelectrical development, fishing complexes, 
mining, industrial plants, and public transportation.90 The Peruvian shipbuilding 
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company, SIMA, agreed to build 80 ships for the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union 
agreed to build a large dry dock facility in Peru to service the soviet fishing fleet.91 
Peru and the Soviet Union had a very extensive relationship in regard to fishing. 
The Soviet Union supported Peru’s assertion of its 200-mile economic coastal water 
zone, while the United States traditionally had not, and Peru had seized U.S. fishing boats 
discovered in Peru’s waters, leading to several disputes. Peru therefore allowed the Soviet 
Union to operate fishing boats within the economic zone, from 30 to 200 miles off the 
coast, the Soviet Union compensating with credit for fishing and refrigeration equipment, 
technical training, and construction of a fishing complex in Paita, a major seaport city in 
the northwest.92 Peru allowed Soviet vessels to dock and receive fuel, rations, and service 
at Peruvian ports. In exchange for fishing in Peru’s waters, the Soviet Union would give a 
cut of its catch to the Peru state seafood company.93 In many cases, Peru did not have the 
equipment, technology, or boats to fish in the areas that the Soviets were able to. The 
fishing agreements overall became extremely lucrative for Peru.  
Fishing agreements were not without their drawbacks, as there was widespread 
opposition to Soviets fishing in Peru’s waters. Pushback arose from nationalists, 
environmentalists, and lobbying groups, with few being anti-Soviet or ideological in 
nature.94 Nationalist sentiment among the population argued that it was Peru’s waters, 
and that it should be Peru fishing in them. Environmentalists were concerned about 
protecting the Peruvian waters and biomass, as well as overfishing. Lobbying groups, 
including the National Fisheries Society, wanted the agreement with the Soviet Union 
revoked, claiming that Soviets were fishing within 30 miles of the coast, even though 
Peruvian inspectors were required on all Soviet vessels. Overall, it seems that the Peru-
Soviet Union fishing agreements were in the interest of mutual economic advancement, 
despite dissenters. 
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Undoubtedly, economic relations with the communist European countries 
increased dramatically after Velasco opened Peru to the East. Besides trade, socialist 
countries had construction projects, offered technology, trained Peruvian students, 
technicians, and professionals, and made strong ties in the fishing industry. While these 
advancements strengthened ties with the communist bloc and weakened ties with the 
United States and the West, it does not appear that Peru’s relationship with the Soviet 
Union and the CMEA was motivated by anything other than diversification and mutual 
economic benefit. 
3. Countertrade 
The CMEA countries used several systems to offer financial assistance to Peru. 
Credit was provided for investment projects which were of public sector priority. Aid was 
also given on the condition that funds were used to purchase commodities from the 
country offering it. In particular, during the 1970s, Peru began using a unique type of 
foreign exchange in order to pay for its debt to the Soviet Union: countertrade. 
Countertrade is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “International trade in which 
goods and services are paid for (partially or in full) by barter or other mechanisms which 
do not involve the exchange of money.”95 Peru began using countertrade after taking on 
large amounts of debt during the 1970s to the Soviet Union and CMEA countries as a 
method of repayment. Some of these countertrade arrangements have already been 
mentioned in the previous sections. 
There are multiple examples of Peru using countertrade with the CMEA. In 
exchange for building the Paita fishing complex, Peru would repay the Soviet Union 
partially with fishmeal and fish products.96 Some instances used triangular trade 
agreements, where three countries were involved. In one case in the early 1980s, Peru 
contracted a French firm to build an oil refinery which had previously built a refinery in 
Bulgaria. As repayment, Peru would provide some refined materials, but also Bulgaria 
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would build storage tanks at the facility to compensate its own countertrade obligations, 
forming a three-way economic arrangement.97 Another example occurred in 1986 where 
Peru would ship goods to Nicaragua to repay its debt to the Soviet Union.98 
The economic agreements for financial assistance and trade arranged between 
Peru, the Soviet Union and CMEA allowed for generous grace periods, low interest rates, 
and generally up to ten years for repayment. Although Peru had a trade surplus with 
Eastern Europe, it had a growing debt which by the end of 1984 amounted to 1.2 billion 
U.S. dollars.99 In the 1980s, Peru began having economic troubles and became 
delinquent in debt repayment to the Soviet Union and CMEA countries, which were 
demanding repayment. In 1983, Peru struck an agreement to repay its debt in the form of 
exports.100 This debt for exports model is not the same type of countertrade as previously 
mentioned, but marked a new category for Peru. 
Peru managed to persuade the Soviet Union and CMEA to accept nontraditional 
exports as a ratio of repayment for its debt. These were semi-manufactured or 
manufactured products instead of raw materials, such as shirts or cloth instead of 
cotton.101 Mostly materials were textile, metal, and fishing products. The advantage of 
manufactured products was that it would increase foreign trade earnings and reduce the 
requirement for foreign exchange.  
As Peru’s economy was under significant stress in the 1980s, Eastern European 
creditors began to realize that countertrade was perhaps the only method to collect 
repayment on Peruvian debts. By 1985, Peru had effectively stopped repayment on most 
of its debt, only making payments of small amounts on interest due.102 Ruben Berrios 
notes that through countertrade negotiations “between 1988 and 1990, Peru was able to 
cancel $192.5 million in debt to [CMEA countries] and it received $255.3 million in new 
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foreign exchange.”103 Although Peru’s debt to the Soviet Union remained relatively 
stable, it was able to enact a creative and diverse profile of repayment. 
The overall effects of Peru’s countertrade with the communist block are unclear. 
Communism dissolved in the early 1990s at the same time that Peru was facing economic 
collapse. Peru was unable to pay its debts, and resorted to adopting a neoliberal fiscal 
austerity program under the newly elected President Alberto Fujimori in order to qualify 
for Western financial assistance programs. While countertrade was a creative way of 
taking advantage of creditors, it does not speak to any particular national security 
concern. Both Peru and the CMEA seemed to choosing what appeared to be the most 
desirable economic options. 
C. MILITARY RELATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION 
The largest and most concerning aspect of Peruvian relations with the Soviet 
Union and communist bloc to the United States was in the form of military and security 
assistance. To understand the background for which Peru sought military equipment from 
the Soviet Union, it is important to examine the historical relationship with the United 
States. In the 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower encouraged Latin American states 
to take charge of their own defense and purchase U.S. military equipment, but when John 
F. Kennedy was elected and launched the Alliance for Progress, the purchase of 
conventional military equipment was discouraged in favor of social and domestic 
development.104 Although Latin America had fought no conventional wars between 
states in modern history, Peru desired security in order to defend against its better 
equipped rival Chile as well as Ecuador. When Peru pressed to purchase the modern U.S. 
F-5 supersonic jet, it was blocked and was offered outdated Korean War planes 
instead.105 After years of haggling, Peru turned to Great Britain and eventually France. 
In 1967 France finally offered to sell Peru 12 Mirage 5 fighter jets, which had performed 
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remarkably well in the Israeli war against Egypt.106 The purchase of French Mirage’s 
was a telling turn. Advanced military equipment locks in external relations for decades, 
and Peru’s decision (or U.S. restriction of options) marked a decisive turn from the Peru-
United States relationship. 
The second major difficulty of foreign relations between the United States and 
Peru which hindered military security cooperation was over fishing and Peru’s assertion 
of a 200 mile economic zone. Although the United Nations held a conference to establish 
the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, it did not resolve the issue of territorial waters and 
exclusive fishing zones, and the United States continued to operate fishing vessels within 
200 miles of the Peruvian coast.107 As the United States only recognized a twelve mile 
coastal waters, fishing boats, mostly from southern California, would frequently fish well 
within Peru’s 200 mile limit.108 The Pelly Amendment, passed in 1967, allowed the 
United States to sanction military assistance and sales to any country that seized U.S. 
fishing vessels outside of 12 nautical miles. It was enacted after Peru seized multiple tuna 
boats, firing upon one which refused to be boarded in February 1969 soon after Velasco 
had taken power.109 Without the ability to purchase military equipment from the United 
States, Peru turned elsewhere. 
From 1973 to 1980, Peru purchased a wide variety of Soviet military equipment. 
The Peruvian Army and Air Force were the main beneficiaries, as the Peruvian Navy 
remained staunchly conservative and anti-communist.110 According to a declassified 
CIA research paper from 1982, Peru purchased:  
Fighter-bomber and transport aircraft, troop-carrying helicopters; medium 
tanks; air defense and field artillery; surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and 
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antitank missiles; other combat and combat support vehicles; and related 
electronic and support equipment.111 
These military procurements would make Peru dependent upon the Soviet Union 
for maintenance, spare parts, training, and technical expertise, and locked in a 
relationship with Russia that exists to this day. A detailed table of military equipment 
sold to Peru as of 1982 can be seen in Figure 2 and Table 3. Throughout Latin America, 
Peru was the single largest client of Soviet military equipment apart from Cuba.  
Peru had motivations for purchasing Soviet equipment, apart from those 
previously outlined as the United States sanctions. In addition to the difficulty of working 
with the United States, Velasco wished to distance Peru from the West and diversify its 
supplying partners in order to combat envisioned U.S. imperialism. Peru and its military 
wanted to modernize and expand its armed forces. Peru also had concern for its neighbor 
and enemy, Chile, who had a considerable armed forces which dwarfed Peru’s in size and 
amount of modern equipment before making purchases from the Soviet Union. Moscow 
offered fast delivery of modern weapons at better prices, with extended credit, lengthy 
grace periods, and lower interest rates than any Western state.112 Finally, Peru wished to 
exert its sovereignty. 
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Figure 2. Key Soviet Weapon Systems in the Peruvian Armed Forces113 
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 Major Soviet Weapons and Equipment in Peruvian Inventory114 
 
 
Soviet motivations for military sales, besides the obvious economic benefit, 
included opening new arms sales markets and bolstering common political interests.115 
Peru was the first in South America to purchase Soviet military equipment. Through 
military sales, the Soviet Union was able to establish a large presence in Peru. Thousands 
of Peruvian military officers studied in the Soviet Union, and Soviet military equipment 
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D. CONCLUSIONS: SOVIET—PERUVIAN TIES DURING THE  
COLD WAR 
It is clear that relations between Peru and the CMEA states increased dramatically 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. While this was certainly cause for concern for the 
United States and the West in an enduring rivalry with the Soviet Union, it does not 
appear that the Soviet Union was able to make significant strategic advances in Peru. 
Politically, the Soviet Union had very little sway over the military government of 
Peru. General Velasco was neither capitalist nor communist, and wanted to remain firmly 
non-aligned with either power during the Cold War. The military leadership, who worked 
closely with Velasco, was generally anti-communist, and had no desire to adopt 
communist ideology. Since the Peruvian Communist Party was weak and never gained a 
foothold, not to mention splitting into the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (opposed by the 
Soviet Union), the Soviet Union was not able to use it as a political lever. Even after 
compiling substantial debt to the communist bloc after the departure of General Velasco 
and later military regimes, the Soviet Union did not use the economic coercion in order to 
twist Peru against the West. Overall, even if the Soviet Union had nefarious intentions in 
Peru during the Cold War, it was unable to make it a proxy in the fashion of Cuba or 
Nicaragua. 
Economically, Peru certainly expanded trade and other economic relations 
dramatically with the Soviet Union and CMEA after the rise of the Velasco regime, but 
there is little evidence that it was strategically beneficial to the Soviet Union. It was in 
Peru’s nationalist interest to diversify trading partners away from the United States to 
combat a perceived U.S. imperialism. While the Soviet Union may have hoped that 
increased economic ties would have led to a break from the West, prior economic 
relationships proved too strong and advantageous to cut off. Proximity to the United 
States, and the sustainability of the capitalist system ultimately were shown to be more 
robust than ties with the East. Manipulations of the Peruvian market along with a number 
of other domestic factors caused a severe economic downturn in the 1980s which led to a 
country incapable of repaying its debts, and of little use to a collapsing Soviet empire. In 
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sum, while the Soviet Union gained significant influence through economic relations in 
Peru, it was unable to capitalize on them. 
The area where the Soviet Union made the most significant gains and enduring 
influence was security and military affairs. Advanced Soviet military equipment sold to 
Peru in the 1970s and 1980s is used to this day, and still requires Russian technical 
training, assistance, maintenance, and spare parts. The advantage of weapons systems 
sales is that their high price and technical requirements lock in interaction between seller 
and buyer for decades. Regardless, the United States set itself up for such a situation by 
refusing military sales to Peru on grounds of what in retrospect seem like petty quarrels. 
The idea that Peru was cozying to the Soviet Union in support of a global Cold War is 
easily refuted, but there is no doubt that Soviet arms sales to Peru tilted the strategic 
balance of power in South America to the Eastern advantage. As will be shown in the 
next chapter, Peru to this day relies on Russian assistance for its military equipment, and 
the effects of Soviet military assistance remain a factor in a new post-Cold War global 
environment. 
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III. CONTEMPORARY PERU—RUSSIA RELATIONS  
As noted in Chapter I, there was little activity between Russia and Latin America 
from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the mid 2000s. In 2008, tensions began to raise 
between the United States and Russia in regards U.S. support for a missile site in Poland, 
Russia’s opposition to talk of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO, and the West’s 
denunciation of Russian aggression in Georgia.116 In November 2008, Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev conducted an historic visit to Latin America by visiting Cuba, 
Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru, marking a turn in international relations by demonstrating a 
re-engagement with the region.117 Since then, Peru and Russia have broadened their ties 
and strengthened their relationship, especially in terms of military and security issues. 
Based on the historic ties between Peru and Russia, it is understandable that since the 
countries regained an economic and political foothold after the turbulent 1990s, they 
would reengage their relations. This chapter will examine the contemporary diplomatic, 
economic, cultural, and security interactions between Peru and Russia. 
A. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
As noted, political relations were renewed between Peru and Russia during the 
2008 Medvedev visit to Peru, where the Russian President was quoted saying that the 
Andean nation was “friends, with whom Russia maintains privileged relations.”118 
Russia signed a series of agreements with Peru as President Alan Garcia intended to 
strengthen ties in military, trade, and scientific cooperation.119 The meeting was the start 
of a second chapter in relations for the two countries, with the possibility of coordination 
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in the fields of energy, hydrocarbons, mining, space industry, and nuclear power.120 The 
overall goal was to restart economic and political ties.  
The diplomatic relationship further strengthened in 2012 when Peruvian President 
Ollanta Humala (President from July 28, 2011—July 28, 2016) became the first Peru 
head of state to visit Russia by attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit in Vladivostok, Russia, where he met with President Vladimir Putin.121 Putin 
and Humala met again at the July 2014 BRICS summit in Brazil and at another state visit 
in Moscow in November 2014.122 In November of 2015 Russia and Peru signed a joint 
declaration of strategic partnership at the Paris Climate accords, intended to strengthen 
“political understanding between both nations and [reaffirm] their willingness to move 
bilateral cooperation forward.”123 The declaration again stressed the engagement areas of 
military cooperation, economic trade, science and technology, culture and education, and 
nuclear power. It came as a surprising move by Peru in light of newly emplaced sanctions 
on the Russian Federation by Western countries due to Russia’s annexation of the 
Crimea. Newly elected Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski met with Vladimir 
Putin at the APEC summit in Lima, Peru, in 2016, where they agreed to triple bilateral 
trade to $1 billion USD over the next three years.124 All of these state visits marked a 
dramatic increase in diplomatic relations from the past. 
Overall, the number of high level Russian visits to Peru from 2000 to 2017 ranks 
sixth among all of Latin America countries, behind Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, 
Nicaragua, and Brazil.125 Since 2008 the Peruvian and Russian presidents have had 
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regular face-to-face meetings on a level never seen before, and have signed agreements 
showing intentions of drastically expanding the Peru-Russia relationship. 
B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Although diplomatic interaction between Peru and Russia made a drastic increase 
since the late 2000s, evidence of planned massive trade increases and economic 
interaction has yet to materialize. In regard to trade, while it is true that economic 
interaction vastly increased after 2008, overall it levelled out well below the desired 
$1 billion USD per year. Peru’s exports to Russia mainly consist of edible fruit and nuts 
at 36% of total, mineral ore at 20%, and seafood at 16%.126 Total exports rose steadily 
from about $25 million USD in 2009 to a 2018 total of $182 million USD in 2018, as 
shown in Figure 3. Peru imports a much greater amount from Russia, the majority being 
fertilizers at 51% and iron and steel at 27% of total.127 Overall, imports from Russia rose 
from a 2009 figure of just under $200 million USD to a near-steady average of  
$300–$350 million USD from 2011 to 2018, with outliers of about $500 million USD in 
2011 and $450 million USD in 2018, as shown in Figure 4. These economic ties are 
modest, if not marginal in terms of Russian trade in the region. In 2013, Peru ranked as 
the 11th largest trading partner in Latin America.128 Although trade has increased and 
continues to increase between the two countries, they remain minor partners dealing 
mainly in raw materials and Peru runs a large trade deficit with Russia, which is unique 
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Figure 3. Peru Exports to Russia by Year (USD)129 
 
Figure 4. Peru Imports from Russia by Year (USD)130 
Peru and Russia have also collaborated in the space arena. Peru’s space agency, 
National Commission for Aerospace Research and Development (CONIDA), which was 
formally established in 1974, had its first organically designed satellites, PUCP-Sat 1 and 
Pocket-PUCP launched into orbit by Russia in November of 2013.131 CONIDA has 
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regularly partnered with Russia, and Russia again launched Peru’s fourth satellite into 
orbit on a spacewalk from the international space station in August of 2014.132 These 
were observation satellites also used with the intent of advancing satellite design. Of 
note, the United States space agency NASA as well has assisted CONIDA in satellite 
launch and technical expertise. Peru also has investigated the use of the Russian satellite 
navigation system, GLONASS, a competitor to the Western GPS system, which would 
make future integrations with any U.S. electronics systems a national security threat.133  
Peru has set its eyes on Russian civilian airliners to replace its aging fleet of 
civilian transport aircraft. Of the 133 Russian-made Superjet 100 (SSJ100) regional 
transport jets in use, 100 are operated in Russia, and Peruvian Airlines has previously 
used Boeing aircraft. It is therefore notable, if not quizzical, that Peru would be one of 
very few countries outside of Russia to use the aircraft. In June 2018, Peruvian Airlines 
signed a letter of intent with Sukhoi to purchase 20 Superjet 100s and MC-21 narrow-
body transports, with plans to complete the purchase in the 2020s.134 The deal has yet to 
be completed. 
Although Peru has had discussions with Russia in the energy sector, little has 
come to fruition. The Russian petroleum company Gazprom has previously shown 
interest in assistance with building a new gas pipeline and a liquid natural gas plant in 
Peru.135 The Russian economy is mainly dependent upon the export of petroleum and 
energy, and it is understandable that Russia would not wish to assist potential competitors 
in a time when the West is discussing diverting European energy dependence from 
Moscow. As mentioned previously, Peru and Russia have discussed the possibility of 
nuclear power, but there has not been concrete action taken. Various other construction, 
manufacturing, and transportation projects have been discussed, but overall China has 
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been the major foreign actor to make inroads into Peru in the area of construction and 
infrastructure, not Russia. 
It is clear that Peru has rebooted political relations with Russia in a dramatic way 
by the number of high-level visits conducted between the two states. Both countries’ 
presidents have supported dramatically increasing economic relations as well as 
coordinating military and scientific cooperation. Scientific assistance has been offered to 
Peru as shown by the coordination in satellite and space technology, but overall it has 
been minor. Very minor strides have been taken by Russia in the realm of energy and 
infrastructure. Economic interaction has risen dramatically in recent years but has not 
amounted to a level which would indicate a special interest. As seen in economic 
relations between Peru and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Peruvian-Russian 
collaboration offers an alternative to the United States led economic system amid 
lingering memories of painful neoliberal economic reforms undertaken by Peru to quell 
economic crisis in the 1990s. To date, it is not evident that economic expansion with 
Russia has resulted in displacing Western companies, trade, or markets. 
C. MEDIA INFLUENCE AND CULTURAL INTERACTION  
During the Cold War, there was little if any evidence that Soviet Union 
significantly influenced the population or culture in Peru. There were a number of 
military, technical, and academic personnel who were sponsored to study at Soviet Union 
and Eastern European universities and specialized schools, but beyond these exchange 
programs the Soviet Union had little cultural interaction. There was no Russian media in 
Peru and most Russians in country were there for training Peruvian personnel and 
technical expertise. Today, there are a few hundred Russian citizens and another 10,000 
Peruvian citizens who have studied at Russian Universities that make up the direct 
Russian sphere of influence, not a significant number.136 There has been little negative 
Peruvian press regarding Russia, even in the wake of the annexation of Crimea, and the 
people generally regard Vladimir Putin in a manner of great respect, even reverence as a 
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strong leader.137 In the more globalized and interconnected modern era, there are more 
opportunities for Russia to influence the Peruvian people and expose the population of 
Peru to Russian ideals, propaganda, culture, and soft power. 
1. Media Influence
One major opportunity for Russian impact is in the Peruvian media. Russia has 
been historically notorious and adept at spreading propaganda in its near abroad, but more 
recently has sought audience in regions all around the globe. As argued previously, 
although Russia has few commercial interests and financial resources in Peru, it still 
focuses on Peruvian media and desires to have a media voice. Russian media has been 
proactive in interacting with Peruvian outlets; during 2015 and 2016, a Russian 
government sponsored supplement, “Russia Beyond the Headlines,” was placed in the 
Peruvian newspaper, El Peruano on multiple occasions.138 The Peruvian edition of the 
Spanish media giant El País distributed a Russian publication on several occasions as 
well.139 The Russian inserts included information on Russian tourist destinations, 
geopolitical issues relevant to Moscow, and military and technological cooperation being 
conducted between Peru and Russia. 
Russia has had success in Latin America on media platforms using television 
broadcasting, social media, and the internet. Russian state run news outlets including RT, 
Sputnik Mundo, TASS, and Voices of Russia are actively broadcast and followed 
throughout the region.140 Latin American media outlets are often under-funded and lack 
resources or ability to properly fact-check, and can often be found republishing Russian 
content.141 In my research for this thesis, I personally have discovered on multiple 
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occasions Peruvian news outlets using Russian news stories as their primary source, often 
entirely copied and translated into Spanish. I was unable to find original reporting from 
Peruvian media outlets on the events covered even after multiple attempts. In Peru, RT 
provides free content to Peru’s Channel 7 television news and broadcasts on 100 local 
cable TV channels around the country.142 Although it is impossible to get accurate 
figures, it is likely that Russian state media reaches a very large number of Peruvians 
using social media and internet sources as well. 
Russian news media is notorious for spreading propaganda, including misleading, 
incomplete, or outright false news in order to undermine the United States and the West, 
and in Latin America there is no exception. Specifically, at a time when Peru was in the 
midst of an arms purchase from the United States, RT Actualidad published a false 
account of the United States establishing a secret military base in the Peruvian Amazon 
rainforest.143 Inference on the timing would indicate that Russia was attempting to 
undermine American legitimacy and possibly hinder an international military security 
agreement. Although this is merely one example of Russian media propaganda 
attempting to undermine the West in Peru, there are countless others found around Latin 
America.144 
2. Cultural Interaction 
There is a prominent presence of Russian cultural promotion in Peru with respect 
to the small size of the Russian expatriates. The Russian Center of Science and Culture, 
based in Lima, is a Russian state funded organization which promotes Russia’s culture in 
Peru.145 The official Russian Embassy website states the objectives of the center, to: 
Contribute to strengthen relations between Russia and Peru in the cultural, 
scientific-technological, educational and humanitarian spheres; 
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Contribute to the formation in Peru of an objective image of the Russian 
Federation as a new democratic state; 
Promote in Peru knowledge of the history and culture of the peoples that 
make up the Russian Federation. Likewise, disseminate information about 
its current internal and external policy, its scientific, cultural and economic 
potential; 
Structure, together with similar entities in Peru, programs and all kinds of 
activities that strengthen the humanitarian, cultural, scientific-technical 
and economic exchange between Russia and Peru.146 
In order to accomplish its objectives, the cultural center regularly holds 
“conferences, symposia, seminars and similar events in order to inform the Peruvian 
public about the challenges Russia faces …[and] artistic and cultural events such as 
recitals, concerts, film cycles, photo exhibitions, painting, sculpture, crafts, etc.”147 Most 
of these events focus on elements of Russian patriotism, including an annual event to 
commemorate the Russian victory in World War II and the defeat of fascism, as well as a 
yearly May 9th celebration of Victory Day.148 Although these events have a limited 
interest among Peruvians, Russia is renowned in other areas such as ballet, circus, dance, 
and music, and which remain popular paid events in Peru. Over 225,000 Peruvians have 
attended Russian circus and ballet shows alone from 2011–2017.149 
Peru continues to maintain academic ties with Russia, as it did during the Cold 
War. The Russian embassy offers approximately 30 scholarships per year, and an 
estimated 50 Peruvian students study in Russia annually.150 Generally, students studying 
in Russia experience a more affordable atmosphere, even those who are not studying  
with the benefit of a scholarship. Russia also has a program where it sponsors young 
leaders to visit the country for increased academic, cultural, and economic interaction and 
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awareness of Russian issues for the Peruvian people.151 As mentioned previously, Russia 
collaborated to launch Peru’s satellite projects, and has also had several cosmonauts visit 
and speak at a Peruvian universities. 
Media influence and cultural interaction between Russia and Peru continues to 
grow, but it is extremely difficult to judge the levels of reach and influence. Russia does 
not publish statistics on numbers of media users from Peru, and overall statistics on 
viewership of Russian media come from the Russian state and cannot be trusted. While 
Russia provides numerous opportunities for cultural and academic interaction, overall it 
reaches a small number of Peruvians, mainly in Lima. Undoubtedly, however, both media 
and cultural efforts have contributed at least slightly to a more positive view of Russia by 
the Peruvian people. 
D. MILITARY RELATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION 
The most notable area of cooperation between Russia and Peru and most 
important to United States interests and foreign policy in the region is military and 
security affairs; namely the sale of military equipment and continued Russian security 
assistance. As noted in Chapter II, Russia sold massive amounts of military equipment to 
Peru during the Cold War, and many of these weapons systems remain in active use 
today. Russia began re-engaging military interaction with Peru in 2008 along with 
renewed diplomatic and economic relations. This section will detail Russian military 
sales and security related activity within Peru since political relations were renewed. 
Peru’s purchases of Russian military equipment did not stop during the period 
after the Cold War. During the presidency of Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s, Peru 
purchased 24 MiG-29 fighter jets, Su-25 ground support aircraft, and Mi-25 attack 
helicopters.152 During the post-2008 renewal of diplomatic ties, Russia worked with 
Russian-friendly Peru senior military leadership to win new contracts and build military 
 
151 Cardenal, 86. 
152 Keir Giles and Robert Evan Ellis, The Rise of Russia: The Turning Point for Russian Foreign 
Policy & the Change of Strategy (N.p.: Madison & Adams Press, 2017), 184. 
45 
relations based on the massive Russian built Peruvian military arsenal.153 Military 
contracts from 2008 to 2010 include a $106 million USD upgrade for Peru’s MiG-29 
aircraft with $400 million USD in follow on commitments to future upgrades, and a 
contract to restore and maintain Peru’s Russian helicopter fleet.154 In 2010, Peru had 
difficulty completing the acquisition of Chinese made tanks and that same year purchased 
two Russian Mi-35 and six Mi-171 helicopters to support operations against the Sendero 
Luminoso terrorists.155 
Military purchases increased dramatically in 2013. Peru purchased 24 more Mi-
171 helicopters for $528 million USD, a contract which included $180 million USD in 
support of the Peruvian economy by mutual production of spare parts.156 That year, the 
Russian minister of defense, Sergey Shoygu visited Peru, and the two countries discussed 
building a factory to manufacture military trucks by the Russian company Kamaz, as well 
as the purchase of 110 T-90S tanks to replace the Cold War era T-55s.157 Neither of 
these possibilities have come to fruition, and Peru has yet to purchase new tanks as of 
writing. Peru has also discussed the purchase of man-portable air defense missiles from 
Russia. Military education exchanges increased as well, and in 2012 Russia sponsored 
200 military officers to study at Russian universities.158 Finally, in 2013 Russia agreed to 
assist Peru in counter-drug operations, including training, information sharing, 
monitoring drug trafficking, and planning and execution of joint operations.159 
Peru’s main Russian assets are its fleet of helicopters, currently more than 100 
strong, the largest Russian inventory in Latin America. Recently Russia has assisted Peru 
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by building several important maintenance facilities. As an update to the purchase of 
24 Mi-171 which was completed in 2015, Peru agreed to upgrade its helicopter radio and 
GPS systems with a Russian model, notably incompatible with U.S. systems.160 In 2018, 
Peru opened its first helicopter maintenance and repair center in Lima, built in 
coordination with Russian Helicopter Holdings, a subsidiary of the massive military 
equipment company, Rostec State Corporation.161 Peru will also open a Russian built 
mobile helicopter service center this year under contract with Rosoboronexport, a major 
Russian defense contractor and also a subsidiary of Rostec.162 These facilities are 
strategically important to Peru; major overhauls will no longer require shipping fuselages 
or engines to Russia for periodic maintenance procedures. 
Every two years, Lima is host to a major Latin American military equipment 
exhibition, SITDEF, the International Technology Hall for Defense and Prevention of 
Disasters. The event hosts countries from around the Latin American region, and has 
limited U.S. participation. Russia uses this event as an opportunity to advertise their 
military products, host discussions on future military sales and cooperation, complete 
previous military deals, and get the public interested in Russian military equipment. Each 
year, Rosoboronexport brings over 200 items of military equipment, including tanks, 
helicopters, and jet aircraft to display.163 At SITDEF 2017, Peru showed interest in 
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purchasing the Russian Sukhoi Su-30MKI BrahMos cruise missile, jointly developed 
between Russia and India.164 
Peruvian reliance on Russia for military sales and security assistance was 
solidified by major arms purchased in 1970s. The country continued to purchase some 
military equipment through the 1990s, and developed a large Russian-built arsenal. 
Maintenance, technical expertise, and equipment familiarity have kept Peru a major 
purchaser of Russian weapons systems, and reliant on Russia for continued security 
cooperation. Much of the information in this section identified plans for future Russian 
weapons sales which thus far have not occurred. Although Peru’s continued reliance on 
Russia is a cause for concern, Peru also leans heavily on the United States for security 
cooperation in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts.165 Although Russian 
security interactions with Peru distance the United States as a partner, diplomatic 
relations have continued to be cordial. 
E. CONCLUSIONS: CONTEMPORARY PERU-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced turbulent economic stress 
while attempting to adopt capitalism and a free market system. Likewise, Peru had severe 
economic difficulties in the 1980s which led to adoption of neoliberal reforms in the 
1990s in order to qualify for International Monetary Fund financial assistance. During the 
time period of the 1980s until 2008, Peru and Russia had little political interaction, but 
completed several large military equipment purchases. Since political re-engagement in 
2008, there have been significant increases in trade and security cooperation. 
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In the economic arena, Russia and Peru greatly increased trade after 2008. 
Imports from Russia rose and steadied off at around $350 million USD per year, and 
exports remain at about $100 million USD. Peru’s trade deficit with Russia indicates that 
Peru’s economy may not benefit financially from exports as much as from Russian 
imports. Peru also does not enjoy a relationship with Russia anything close to what Cuba 
did during the Cold War. Although there was a dramatic increase in the level of trade, 
desired levels of $1 billion USD per year were never achieved. 
Militarily, Peru continues to purchase equipment and services from Russia. As 
noted earlier, the past purchase of major weapons systems has locked in Russia as a 
strong security partner. Recent purchases of equipment raise the concern of corruption in 
a country with a historically corrupt government. Some have alleged that expensive arms 
purchases involve more than meets the eye. Many planned or discussed military sales and 
security agreements have not yet come to fruition. Next to Venezuela, Peru plays a 
dominant role in Russian arms purchases in South America. 
Finally, in the aspect of media and cultural influence, Russia has sought to 
influence the Peruvian population. Culturally, Russia seeks influence with public events 
and shows, but the small Russian population and number of Peruvians who have 
interacted with Russia keeps influence to a minimum, along with events being limited  
to the capital of Lima. The area in which it is most difficult to gauge effectiveness,  
as well as being a major cause for concern, is media influence. Without knowing how 
many Peruvians are consumers of Russian media, or how many are persuaded by its 
propaganda, it is difficult to know how well Russia has penetrated. As seen in previous 
information operations, the Russians can be particularly effective, which should be cause 
for concern if Russia sees an opportunity arise in Peru. 
Overall, Russia has certainly resumed relations with Peru, but perhaps not to the 
level of major concern. Understanding what the findings of this chapter entail is the goal 




During the Cold War, Peru dramatically expanded its relationship with the Soviet 
Union, causing alarm to the United States. The research outlined in Chapter II shows that 
Peru’s motivations for the relationship were to increase its national security vis-à-vis rival 
neighbors, flex a nationalist sentiment by reducing reliance on the United States, and to 
achieve economic diversification by expanding trade partners and attempting creative 
economic restructuring. Soviet motivations may indeed have been nefarious in nature, 
perhaps to undermine the United States’ influence in the region and support the move 
toward socialism in Peru. If these were indeed Soviet motivations, they did not amount to 
a successful outcome. Hindsight shows that the Velasco regime was neither socialist nor 
capitalist, and the Soviet Union had little political influence over Peru. Economically, the 
Soviet Union gained little from Peru as a trade partner. Most importantly, the sale of 
Russian military equipment made the Soviet Union and modern-day Russia an enduring 
security partner. 
The contemporary relationship between Peru and Russia is marked by a similar 
rapid expansion much like occurred in the 1970s. Russia and Peru have opened a political 
dialogue, increased trade, and resumed military sales and security cooperation. Russia is 
using its infamous media propaganda arm to attempt to guide the Peruvian population in 
the direction of its preference. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that Russian 
activity has pushed Peru away from the United States, or that Russian influence has made 
a dramatic impact in Peru. The relationship has likely advanced an overall favorable 
impression of Russia within the government of Peru and with the population, but it is 
impossible to know to what extent. So, is the current Peruvian-Russian relationship a 
return to Cold War tactics? 
There are certainly similarities, and by comparing the conclusions from the Cold 
War relationship to the contemporary, there is evidence that Russia’s current moves 
harken to the Soviet model. In both 1970 and 2008 Peru quickly moved to increase 
interaction with the Russian state. Both the past and modern relationships rapidly 
increased political, economic, and military interaction. The contemporary relationship 
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includes much more Russian media and cultural influence. Just as during the Cold War, 
Russian political and economic influence has been shown to be limited, and dwarfed by 
those of the United States and China. The current relationship between Russia and Peru 
has not pushed the United States away as a partner, and Peru and the United States 
maintain an excellent relationship. It is evident that Russian activity is much more 
prevalent in Latin American countries that do not have such a cordial relationship with 
the United States, such as Nicaragua, Venezuela, Argentina, and Cuba. It is important to 
note that open hostility in these countries toward the United States is present to the 
current day, unlike in Peru. Although Russia to this point has not been significantly 
successful at undermining United States influence in Peru, this motivation should be 
assumed based on recent interaction and past Russian activity around the world. 
A. STRATEGIC IMPACT 
Although Russian resurgence is of strategic interest, there is not much cause for 
economic concern. Russia is not in a position to dramatically raise its trade levels with 
Peru to the levels discussed in Chapter III. Sanctions have been painful to Russia, and its 
economy is heavily reliant on the price of energy, which is currently quite low. Russia 
does not have nearly the economic influence in Peru or Latin America than that of the 
United States or China, and Russia does not seem to be in any position to displace U.S. 
companies or markets. Peru will most likely maintain a close economic relationship with 
the United States for years to come. 
Despite economic limitations, Russia’s relationship with Peru and Latin America 
is cause for strategic concern for the United States. Russia has been openly hostile toward 
the United States, and since the 2016 election interference, subsequent Western sanctions, 
and conflict in Syria, the relationship does not seem to be improving. Latin America’s 
proximity and historic ties with the United States make it of particular interest. Events in 
Latin America can directly affect the United States as seen by migration, gang violence, 
and drug trafficking. Peru is geographically important because it neighbors Chile and 
Colombia, both of which are more pro-U.S. than Peru itself. If Peru should turn further 
toward Russia it could impact its relationship with these strategically important 
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neighbors. Peru’s Russian military equipment allows for an enduring security relationship 
and presence, which could easily translate to influence. So far, Peru has not been host to 
Russian warships or bombers, as recently seen in Venezuela, but if Peru were to allow 
more Russian military access there would be even more concern for U.S. influence and 
access. Importantly, beyond the scope of this thesis, Russian influence in Peru is just one 
marker of rising Russian influence more broadly in other areas of Latin America.166 
Russia’s presence in Peru and Latin America has the ability to undermine the U.S. 
role in the region. The re-engagement by Russia with Latin America affects how the 
region interacts with international organizations. Dr. R. Evan Ellis names three specific 
categories these impact: undermining the likeliness of key actors to work with the United 
States within Latin America and on the world stage, isolating pro-U.S. states, and 
enabling and emboldening anti-U.S. regimes, namely the ALBA countries and Argentina, 
by allowing them to host and support Russian activity which strategically threatens the 
United States.167 In the case of Peru, these categories loosely apply, are plausible in the 
future, but currently aren’t of national security concern. First, Peru’s inclination toward 
the United States has not yet been undermined, but it is certainly possible if the 
relationship with Russia becomes stronger in the future. Second, Peru borders the two 
most pro-U.S. countries in the region, Colombia and Chile. To date Russia’s influence in 
Peru hasn’t led to any sort of isolation of Chile or Peru, despite proximity. Peru has had 
multiple historic quarrels with Chile, and much of Colombian cocaine originates in Peru; 
Russia’s influence is capable of undermining these historically tenuous relationships 
through political pressure or propaganda. Finally, although Peru is no longer an ALBA 
country, it has been in the past, and may consider rejoining in the future depending on the 
political atmosphere. While not currently a major concern, these issues are of strategic 
interest to the United States. 
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52 
Latin America’s engagement with Russia, along with other countries such as 
China, undermines the West’s U.S.-led direction of multinational organizations. Russia 
has been extremely receptive to working with regional organizations like the OAS, 
UNASUR, CELAC, and ALBA. Russia’s engagement with Latin American countries and 
Peru also give it more opportunities to sway opinions within the United Nations. The 
closer Russia becomes with Latin America, the more difficult it is for the United States to 
mobilize coalitions of votes within the UN and agreement on international issues. Russia 
was able to turn to Latin America as a food supplier because of a lack of support for 
Russian sanctions in response to the crisis in Ukraine.168 Latin American countries have 
previously disagreed with United States’ international actions and Russian influence in 
Peru will likely sway disagreement in the future. 
Russia’s growing activity in Peru and Latin America does not present an 
immediate military threat. However, Russia is capable of diverting U.S. attention and 
resources away from concerns in other parts of the world. The deployment of Russian 
nuclear-capable forces such as two strategic bomber aircraft to Venezuela in 2018 is an 
example of this.169 Peru has had territorial disputes with Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile. 
In the possibility that these disputes once again rise to the threat of violence,  
Russia would have the opportunity of supporting military action against a U.S. ally. 
Willingness to work with Russia creates regional security concerns which undermine the 
United States. 
Finally, the most foreboding and in this author’s opinion the most likely 
possibility of the impact of the Russian-Peruvian relationship relates to Russian media 
influence. As discussed in Chapter III, Russia has a strong media presence in Peru and 
Latin America, and lessons from the 2016 U.S. presidential elections remain fresh. Russia 
does not have much economic or political influence in Peru and the military relationship 
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remains relatively steady, but media is an area which is low cost and could produce high 
payoff for undermining the United States or the West. 
Peru’s political climate is extremely precarious, and since the 1990s the country 
has seen multiple presidents accused of corruption, human rights abuses, and facing jail 
time or committing suicide. The current president, Martín Vizcarra dissolved congress in 
early October, 2019, and the country faces yet another political crisis.170 Should Russia 
wish to capitalize on political turbulence, Peru is ripe for the taking, and Russia is fully 
capable of launching a propaganda attack to sway the population in a direction of its 
choosing. If Russia could tip the political scales in Peru, the United States might see an 
anti-Western government in power with the ability to damage U.S. standing in the region. 
It is unknown if Russia has the willpower to launch such a campaign, or if it would be 
worth the strategic risk, but it remains a distinct possibility. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Russia’s interest in Peru should be viewed most importantly as a microcosm of its 
interest in Latin America as a region. The United States should understand Russia’s 
influence not simply on economic, political, or military terms, but in how it affects the 
U.S. position on the world stage, in-line with Russia’s strategic goals of undermining the 
United States and the West. Russia’s activity, directly and indirectly, can harm U.S. 
national security and ability to influence global consensus. 
The United States has viewed Latin America largely in terms of the effects of 
migration, disaster relief, trafficking, and crime, and often underplays its strategic 
importance since the end of the Cold War. Even the well-known nickname for the 
military headquarters, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), is 
“Sleepycom” due to the lack of U.S. military activity and security interest. The United 
States should maintain a mindset that although issues in Latin America rarely affect the 
United States in a major way, they have a strategic capability of threatening U.S. interest. 
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The region is easily capable of shifting toward an anti-U.S. sentiment overall, and 
individual states such as Peru need specific attention. 
The first step to understanding Russia and other regional actors’ activities is in-
depth analysis and consideration of how these activities may be used to undermine the 
United States on the strategic world stage, which is one of the objectives of this thesis. 
This analysis should keep in consideration how other world powers such as China would 
side or react in major conflicts with the United States.  
Understanding the implications of the Russia-Peru relationship have revealed that 
although there is no immediate cause for major concern, it is important the United States 
makes a concerted effort to maintain strong relationships with Peru and other partner 
nations in Latin America. USSOUTHCOM should continue efforts in security 
cooperation, including U.S. hospital ship visits, staff talks, training teams and 
professional military education, exercises, partnering in counter-terrorism and counter-
drug efforts, and intelligence sharing. If possible, the United States should pursue higher 
profile military sales to Peru to ween the state from reliance on Russian support. The 
United States should make clear to Peru and Latin America that in the long-term, it is a 
better and more desirable partner than Russia. 
Keeping Russia economically non-viable in Latin America is also a desired 
method to minimize its influence in Peru. Sanctions should be maintained until Russia 
has proven itself as a responsible world actor. Since oil makes the Russian economy run, 
diversifying Western energy suppliers will keep the country from making significant 
economic inroads into Peru and Latin America. Low oil prices would be key in this 
aspect, as well as moving Europe away from Russian energy reliance.  
This thesis has relied on open-source unclassified documents. It has been 
revealing how extremely difficult it is to find current reliable information on Russian 
military sales and security activity in Peru. News releases are often directly from Russian 
media, and U.S. media outlets simply do not cover such material. U.S. media should not 
expect to profit from news relating to Latin American security issues, but it is extremely 
important that Russian activity in Peru remains public information and is kept under a 
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watchful eye by the U.S. government. If the U.S. intelligence agencies or U.S. Embassy 
Lima are not paying close attention, they should be. 
Peru is its own state and is at liberty to do what is in its best interest, but this 
author has one recommendation. Russia is notorious for its media propaganda, influence, 
meddling, and outright lies. Ukraine was the subject of a major Russian media campaign 
that was extremely effective, and is a model which may be replicated in other countries. 
Russia attempted to sway the results of the U.S. presidential election, and we should 
assume that it will use social and public media venues to do so again and in other 
countries such as Peru. As noted, it can be very difficult to find current news on security 
issues in Peru, even from Spanish language and local outlets. Peru should invest as much 
as possible in expanding its organic news and social media outlets to ensure that it 
maintains a free and objective press, without relying on Russia. The more Russia 
infiltrates the Peruvian media, the more the country is at risk to the whims of an 
autocratic state. 
This research has revealed that Russia’s recent activity certainly resemble Cold 
War tactics in Peru, and as in the Cold War, have not yet shown strategic effects clearly 
beneficial to Russia.  Yet these recent developments in the Russian-Peruvian relationship 
present strategic issues which are capable of undermining United States’ national 
interests and security. Peru presents a case which should be noted for its ambiguity. The 
military regime which took power in 1968 has been studied on many levels, but this 
thesis is the first to compare Peru’s close ties with the Soviet Union to modern Russian 
interaction. The case of Peru is specifically important because it demonstrates the 
complexity of international relationships, and shows how countries are not motivated 
strictly by extra-territorial great powers. Peru maintains a good relationship with the 
United States, unlike during the Cold War. Loyalty is based on a great number of factors, 
but financial interests are often overstated, as seen by the events of the Velasco regime. 
Russia’s influence in modern-day Peru remains minor, but it is a harbinger which may be 
telling of support for U.S.-led Western world norms. If Peru should turn against the 
United States, others in Latin America and around the world may not be far behind. 
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